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CASE TO SAVE MAINE’S BASES

The 2005
BRAC
Process:

In this article, Derek Langhauser gives a post mortem
of Maine’s response to the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission’s announcement of imminent

The Case to Save
Maine’s Bases

Although Maine did not “win back” the Brunswick

by Derek P. Langhauser

facility, Maine rescued the facilities in Portsmouth-

closures in Portsmouth-Kittery, Brunswick and Limestone.

Kittery and Limestone, secured additional resources for
the Bangor Air National Guard and Bangor Naval
Reserve Center, and was granted an expansion of the
Limestone accounting center. As Derek Langhauser conveys,
Maine’s response to the BRAC Commission’s original
announcement is testament to the extraordinary capacity
of the people of this state to work together in times
of crisis.
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CASE TO SAVE MAINE’S BASES

Maine’s congres“Our best chance of saving Portsmouth,
Brunswick and Limestone is to treat the
Secretary’s recommendations like a lawsuit,
the Commission like a court, and to present
our position like a legal case.”
United States Senator
Olympia J. Snowe,
May 2005

INTRODUCTION

O

n May 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld announced his department’s list of
base closures and realignments. It was truly Friday the
13th for Maine: the secretary’s major recommendations
proposed closing Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the
Limestone Defense Finance and Accounting Service
(DFAS), and substantially reducing Brunswick Naval
Air Station (NAS). Maine’s job loss from these recommendations was the second largest in the nation, with
at least 13,800 direct and indirect jobs slated to be lost.
Maine’s congressional delegation and governor (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Maine”) had only weeks
to prepare for site visits, and less than two months
to prepare for its four-hour formal hearing before
the Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Commission.
By late August, the commission had reached its
decisions on these and all of the secretary’s other
recommendations around the country. The commission
approved 86% of the secretary’s recommendations,
a higher percentage than any of the four preceding
BRAC Commissions. And, while the commission recommended closing the Brunswick NAS, the
state had saved the Portsmouth shipyard, saved the
Limestone DFAS, won expansion of the Limestone
center, won two additional planes and their crews for
the Bangor Air National Guard, and secured several
jobs for the Bangor Naval Reserve Center.1
This article presents an account of the three
months in 2005—from early May to late August—
during which Maine prepared and presented these
cases, focusing on the background, issues, determining
factors, and lessons of this BRAC round.

THE BRAC PROCESS

A

sional delegation

fter years of unsuccessful
and governor…
efforts to close military
bases and to shift assets to new
[had] less than
and emerging threats, Congress
in 1988 created by statute the
two months to
base realignment and closure
process, commonly known as
prepare for its
“BRAC.” Under this process,
the Defense Department invenfour-hour formal
tories all of its domestic military assets and identiﬁes those
hearing before
that it believes no longer have
the highest military value. The
the Defense Base
department then recommends
to an independent commission
Realignment and
closing or realigning (e.g., typically reducing but sometimes
Closure (BRAC)
expanding) such facilities.2
That commission, consisting
Commission.
in this round of nine former
generals, admirals, and government ofﬁcials appointed by the
president, reviews the department’s recommendations.3 The commission can accept,
reject, or modify the secretary’s recommendations, but
it can only reject or modify a recommendation if the
commission ﬁnds that the secretary “substantially deviated” from the Department’s “Force Structure Plan”—a
broad national defense planning document—and at
least one of eight speciﬁc statutory criteria.
The ﬁrst four criteria, which are expressly given
priority by the BRAC statute, relate to these “military
values”: (1) mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the total force; (2) availability
and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace,
including staging areas for the use in homeland defense
missions; (3) ability to accommodate contingency,
mobilization, surge and future total force requirements;
and (4) cost of operations and the manpower implications. The last four criteria—which are given less
priority by the statute—speak to these administrative
and community values: (5) extent and timing of potential costs and savings; (6) economic impact on existing
communities; (7) ability of the infrastructure of both
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the existing and potential receiving communities to
support forces, missions and personnel; and (8) environmental impact, including the impact of costs related
to environmental restoration and compliance.4
After the secretary issues his recommendations, the
BRAC Commission tours each affected facility, hears
from each affected state at a regional hearing, hears
from the Defense Department, and then makes its own
recommendations as to which facilities have the highest
military and related values under these eight criteria.
The commission sends these revised recommendations
to the president and Congress who must each accept
or reject the commission’s list in its entirety. If both fail
to reject the list, the recommendations on the list take
effect, and facilities have up to six years to implement
their closures or realignments. Commissions on average
have accepted 84% of the secretary’s recommendations, and no president or Congress has ever rejected a
commission’s list of recommendations.

The challenge of defending three very
different facilities—a shipyard, an air
station and an accounting center—
would require excellent organization.
PRIOR BRAC ROUNDS

T

he 2005 round of base closures was the ﬁfth of its
kind, with prior rounds occurring in 1988, 1991,
1993, and 1995. In those four rounds, commissions
closed 97 and realigned 55 major bases, and closed or
realigned 235 additional facilities. Ofﬁcials estimate
that approximately $29 billion have been saved from
these rounds.5
The 2005 round, however, was far more complex
and far-reaching than these previous rounds. After
developing an estimated 25 million data points
and running 1,000 different scenarios, the Defense
Department presented 190 separate recommendations
involving as many as 837 distinct closures or realignments at 160 different installations. These recom40 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Winter 2005

mendations consisted of closing 33 and realigning
29 major bases and making 775 other changes. The
department expected to achieve long-term savings
of nearly $48 billion from implementation of these
recommendations.
Given this enormous dollar value and the more
than 800 “moving parts” as the commission chair
called them, the 2005 round was the largest, most
complex, and most aggressive base closure round in
American history. Indeed, as the commission would
later note, “Secretary Rumsfeld was very clear that
his primary goal for the [2005] BRAC process was
military transformation.”
DEFINING MAINE’S STRATEGY

M

aine’s strategy for ﬁghting these closures was
based on the legal and historical background
just described.
Organization. The challenge of defending three
very different facilities—a shipyard, an air station
and an accounting center—would require excellent
organization. Maine’s congressional delegation of
Senators Snowe and Susan Collins and Representatives
Tom Allen and Michael Michaud came together
quickly to assign tasks. They also worked closely
with Governor John Baldacci, who funded expert
consultants. For the Portsmouth shipyard, the delegation also coordinated closely with New Hampshire’s
four congressmen and governor.
Planning window. Unlike prior rounds that
required the department to plan just six years out,
the 2005 BRAC statute imposed a 20-year planning
window. This placed a greater burden on the Defense
Department to justify the long-term implications of its
recommendations. For example, could the department
really show what the Navy’s submarine repair needs
would be 20 years from now?
Excess vs surge capacity. Previous BRAC statutes
focused almost exclusively on whether the department
had too much “excess capacity.” The 2005 statute,
however, required the additional consideration of
“surge capacity.” Surge capacity is the reverse concept
of too much excess capacity; it speaks to whether there
is enough excess capacity to meet foreseeable, even if
arguably remote, emergency needs. For example, if
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the Portsmouth shipyard were closed, would there be
enough excess capacity among the Navy’s nuclear ship
repair yards to accommodate the inevitable crisis?
Military value. By expressly prioritizing the four
military value criteria, the statute required faithful, if
not begrudging, respect for the fact that community or
state economic impact would not be a priority for the
commission. For the same reason, saving money, while
certainly an important consideration, would also not
be a decisive factor for either the department or the
commission if there were not a corresponding military
value to such savings.
Force Structure Plan. The Defense Department’s
“Force Structure Plan,” although primarily a broad
conceptual planning document, raised some questions
about how many submarines the Navy expected to
have 20 years out. For example, the plan suggested
that the Navy would go from approximately 55
submarines in 2005 to approximately 45 submarines
in 2025. But what was the source of and rationale for
this relatively dramatic reduction, and did it erroneously assume congressional support for such a reduction? Furthermore how did they square with the Chief
of Naval Operations’ seemingly inconsistent testimony
to the BRAC Commission on May 17, 2005, indicating that Navy was moving to a force level of 41,
not 45, submarines?
History of other commissions. Prior commissions
dealt with both naval air stations and shipyards,
so knowledge of their analyses and fate would be
instructional. For example, the closure and/or realignment of naval air stations like Brunswick were among
the commissions’ most common acts. For shipyards,
however, the record was more mixed.
For example, the 1991 commission closed the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, and the 1993 commission closed shipyards in South Carolina and Mare
Island, California. The 1993 commission, which spoke
declaratively of the need to eliminate “considerable”
excess yard capacity, also considered on its own initiative closing shipyards in both Portsmouth and Long
Beach, California. At that time, the Navy argued against
closing Portsmouth, and the commission never added
either to the list of recommendations sent to the president. Similarly, the 1995 commission closed the shipyard in Long Beach and a ship repair facility in Guam

and, as its predecessor did in 1993, the commission
on its own initiative ofﬁcially considered closing the
Portsmouth shipyard. Again, however, the Navy argued
against closing Portsmouth facility, and the 1995
commission never added Portsmouth to its recommendations to the president. In addition, the 1995 commission did not deﬁne the excess yard capacity by 1995 to
be “considerable.”
Knowledge of this history showed that naval air
stations like Brunswick often lost in BRAC rounds,
and that shipyards like Portsmouth lived or died—and
mostly died—on the issue of excess capacity. However,
it also showed that excess shipyard capacity had been
signiﬁcantly drawn down by the acts of the 1993 and
1995 commissions, especially with the closure of the
shipyard in Charleston, South Carolina, which, like the
one in Portsmouth, was a nuclear facility. Furthermore,
because the Portsmouth shipyard appeared on both the
1993 and 1995 potential closure list, Maine knew that
Portsmouth was both vulnerable and capable of weathering a challenge.
Importance of the commission. The structure and
history of the BRAC process showed that if Maine
were going to win, it had to be at the commission
level. Although it is theoretically possible to reverse a
commission recommendation by appealing ﬁrst to the
president and then to Congress, this had never successfully occurred in any of the prior rounds. Indeed, such
appeals are counter to the very reason that a president
and Congress created such commissions, i.e., to permit
progressive change in national defense without obstruction by more narrow parochial interests.
Likewise, going to court would hold little promise,
since both the Supreme Court of the United States and
several lower courts had effectively foreclosed judicial
review of the substantive BRAC decisions by defense
secretaries, BRAC Commissions, and presidents.6 For
example, these courts, including the Maine federal
district court in a challenge to the closure of Loring
Air Force Base in 1991, consistently rejected some 20
different constitutional and statutory claims against
the BRAC process. Speciﬁcally, the courts have held
that the process is a permissible, delegated, administrative power because the BRAC statute contains speciﬁc
substantive standards (i.e., the eight listed criteria) and
clear procedural safeguards (i.e., the mechanisms for
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presidential and congressional disapproval). Similarly,
the courts have held that, by enacting a statute that has
a commission provide technical review of the secretary and the president and Congress provide political
review of the commission, Congress did not intend
to provide substantive judicial review of the process.
Instead, questions of “military judgment” are better left,
the courts have said, to the more expert policy decisions of the executive and legislative branches.
Factual defense. The BRAC statute required Maine to
show not just that the secretary of defense committed a
technical error in arriving at his recommendations, but
that he “substantially deviated” from at least one of the
eight statutory criteria cited above. To meet this high
standard, Maine’s attack would ﬁrst have to be factual.
And the strongest facts would be those that were “certiﬁed” (for reliability) by the Defense Department, and
related to at least one of the four military value criteria.
Such fact-based analysis would require signiﬁcant input
from the local groups at each of the three installations.
Once these facts were in hand, they could be marshaled
into a weight analysis; the pertinent criterion to which
such analysis applied could be identiﬁed, and such
analyses could be used to argue “substantial deviation.”
With history demonstrating that commissions accept all
but about 16% of the department’s recommendations,
such factual discipline would be essential.
Justiﬁcation for recommendation. A review of all four
commission reports between 1988 and 1995 demonstrated that Maine’s case had to focus very speciﬁcally
on the secretary’s stated justiﬁcation for his recommendation. Prior commission reports showed that it
was the secretary’s speciﬁc stated justiﬁcation—and not
some broader conceptual or other factual argument—
that would be judged by the Commission.
So with each of these ideas in mind, Maine set
about making its case for the facilities in Portsmouth,
Brunswick, Limestone, and Bangor.
THE CASE FOR THE
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

P

ortsmouth Naval Shipyard, which despite its name
is located in Kittery, is one of four public nuclear
shipyards run by the Navy. Its basic job is to repair
nuclear submarines. The secretary recommended closing
42 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Winter 2005

the Portsmouth yard and moving its various repair and
planning functions to Norfolk, Virginia, and Puget
Sound, Washington. This recommendation projected
saving $1.3 billion and causing 9,166 direct and indirect job losses. Because of the size of these impacts, this
recommendation was one of the most closely watched
and hotly contested in the entire 2005 BRAC round.
The secretary justiﬁed his recommendation to
close the Portsmouth shipyard by arguing that there
was enough aggregate excess capacity across their four
shipyards to warrant closing the facilities in either
Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. The secretary argued
there was insufﬁcient excess capacity to close any
other shipyard or combination of shipyards, and that
Portsmouth was selected rather than Pearl Harbor
because closing the Portsmouth shipyard would eliminate excess capacity while retaining a shipyard with an
operational homeport in the Paciﬁc. The Portsmouth
shipyard, situated on the Atlantic without an operational homeport, was thereby deemed to be less desirable than the yard in Pearl Harbor.
In response to this justiﬁcation for closure, Maine
made three primary arguments. As a threshold matter,
Maine argued that underlying the plan to reduce
submarine repair capacity was the department’s
apparent, though not expressly clear, long-term plan
to reduce the size of the Navy’s submarine ﬂeet from
55 to 45 (or perhaps 41) boats. Maine, seizing on the
uncertainty of the statute’s 20-year window, challenged
the quality of this presumption.7 For example, Maine
pointed to the increasing submariner threat posed by
China as evidence of the Navy’s misjudgment in planning for this level of reduction.
Second, Maine argued that Portsmouth’s highly
skilled workforce has made the Portsmouth yard
the Navy’s most productive shipyard and that their
expertise would be irretrievably lost because they
would likely not move to Virginia or Washington. For
example, because of the shipyard’s efﬁciency, it had
provided approximately 60 additional weeks of submarine operation time over the last ﬁve years by returning
boats ahead of schedule. By contrast, 124 weeks of
operation time had been lost due to the combined
inefﬁciencies of the other shipyards. Furthermore, the
then-current performance at the other shipyards was
already resulting in an additional loss of 108 weeks
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By rejecting the
of operational time for 2006. Extrapolating from these
ﬁgures, Maine argued that, over the next ﬁve years,
the Navy would lose at least 184 weeks of submarine
operation time—37 weeks per year—if the commission closed Portsmouth. Maine then argued that the
Navy could ill afford to lose those 37 weeks because,
as the commander of Naval submarine forces had
testiﬁed to Congress that summer, “possibly the best
Force level yardstick (for submarines) is the Combatant
Commander deployment requests for daily submarine
operations, which exceeds what we can provide with
the current force, and [these] Commanders currently
want 150 percent of the critical mission days that we
can provide.”
Third, Maine challenged the Navy’s excess and
surge capacity analyses. On this issue, the Navy had
asserted that closing the Portsmouth shipyard would
still leave excess capacity in the other three shipyards.
Maine argued, however, that the Navy’s own data
showed that the Navy overestimated the workload
capacity of the three other yards, underestimated
the workload efﬁciency of Portsmouth, and if the
Portsmouth shipyard were closed, there would be
little to no capacity for any “surge” at the remaining
three yards.
This point was bolstered by the testimony to
Congress by the director of naval reactors that “any
further reductions in [submarine repair] capacity would
push the limits of viability and eliminate the modest
surge capacity we have today.” Further driving home
this point was a retired admiral whom the secretary’s
ofﬁce prevented from testifying at Maine’s regional
hearing. Although the admiral’s testimony had been
previously cleared by one Navy ofﬁce, the secretary’s
ofﬁce informed the admiral, just hours before the
hearing, of potentially severe personal consequences
for testifying. Maine, however, deduced that such
consequences only attached to an appearance before
the commission in an ofﬁcial session and not to an
appearance before a less formal fact-ﬁnding session.
Accordingly, Maine did not present the admiral’s testimony at the formal regional hearing, but his views
were later made available to commission staff and
members in an informal session.
In rendering its decision, the commission agreed
with Maine on all of Maine’s major points. The

commission ﬁrst agreed that
secretary’s recomlooking out the 20-year
window, there were concerns
mendation on the
about how large the submarine ﬂeet would or should
Portsmouth Naval
be by 2025, and that these
concerns were exacerbated by
Shipyard—one of the
the “uncertainties of future
threats” by countries like China.
most visible, contested,
The commission also agreed
with Maine that, while there
and valuable (i.e.,
was approximately 27% excess
depot maintenance capacity
$1.3 billion) recomacross the four yards, this excess
capacity fell to a mere 8% if
mendations of this
Portsmouth shipyard closed.
Finding that this percentage
entire BRAC round—
did not provide for adequate
surge capability, the commission
the commission
concluded that the secretary’s
recommendation to close the
showed its clear indePortsmouth yard substantially deviated from the surge
pendence from the
capacity factor in criterion 3.
The commission then voted,
Defense Department.
with just one dissenter, to keep
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
open.8
By rejecting the secretary’s recommendation on
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard—one of the most
visible, contested, and valuable (i.e., $1.3 billion)
recommendations of this entire BRAC round—the
commission showed its clear independence from the
Defense Department. Maine had won the Portsmouth
shipyard back, and it did so from the very grounds
that it argued.
THE CASE FOR THE
BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION

B

runswick Naval Air Station is also operated by the
Navy. It provides maritime patrols of the North
Atlantic and an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform in support of the war on terrorism.
The secretary recommended realigning Brunswick
by moving its aircraft and personnel to Jacksonville,
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Florida. The Defense Department projected the loss
of 4,266 direct and indirect jobs in Maine and the
savings of $239 million. The secretary’s justiﬁcations
for realigning the Brunswick NAS were cost savings
and efﬁciency; the department did not argue that the
realignment would enhance any other military value.

Maine did not wait until its regional
hearing to make its case…[but] made its
case much earlier at the site visits and in
its frequent coordinated communications
with commissioners and staff.
The department’s deliberative documents showed
that the decision to realign the Brunswick NAS was
a compromise between those within the Navy who
wanted to close it for full savings, and those within the
U.S. Northern Command, Fleet Forces Command, and
the department’s Infrastructure Executive Council who
wanted to retain it for its strategic location and future
capability. When faced with the closure recommendation, Maine looked to these three expert groups and
advanced their arguments: that the Brunswick NAS is
the last active duty defense airﬁeld in New England
and one of only two (the other being McGuire Air
Force Base in southern New Jersey) in the Northeast.
Maine further argued that closure would eliminate a
homeland defense staging and training area, and that
closure would forgo a militarily strategic location near
North Atlantic sea lanes and the closest point to Europe
and the Middle East. In addition, Maine argued that
Brunswick NAS had unique and modern facilities that
could support the Navy’s entire military aircraft inventory and that any actual cost savings would be far less
than projected.
After the initial hearing where Maine raised all
of these issues, the commission on its own initiative
considered closing Brunswick to achieve even greater
cost savings. The commission then accorded Maine
a new hearing on that proposal and the Defense
44 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Winter 2005

Department, ironically enough, joined Maine’s effort at
this hearing to dissuade the commission from closing
the Brunswick facility.
In the end, however, the commission again
showed its independence, concluding that “closure
would reduce excess capacity and result in signiﬁcant
savings while realignment would accomplish neither”
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2005: 102). The commission found that closure
would yield $798 million in savings; realignment
would have produced only $239 million. The commission also argued that even without Brunswick there
were still suitable operating sites to support the
department’s mission support responsibilities elsewhere in New England. The commission also rejected
Maine’s homeland defense arguments, ﬁnding that
the commission’s other realignments addressed the
homeland defense needs of New England. Here, the
commission was primarily referring to its decision
to keep open the Otis Air National Guard Base in
Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Finally, the Commission
reasoned that closure was better than realignment
for the local community because realignment made
it “virtually impossible for the community to successfully redevelop the site” (Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission 2005: 102). With just one
vote to spare, the commission rejected the views, not
only of Maine, but also of the secretary of defense,
U.S. Northern Command, Fleet Forces Command,
and the Infrastructure Executive Council, and then
voted to close Brunswick.9
THE CASE FOR LIMESTONE DEFENSE
FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

T

he Defense Finance and Accounting Service,
known as “DFAS,” at Limestone provides
accounting services to all branches of the military. Created to soften the regional economic blow
from closure of Loring Air Force Base in 1994, the
Limestone DFAS is one of 26 such accounting facilities
around the country. The Defense Department recommended closing the Limestone facility and 22 others
in order to collapse the entire system into just three
centers. The department’s goal on the Limestone DFAS
was clear: to save money and streamline efﬁciency by
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eliminating 391 direct and indirect jobs in Maine.
Maine advanced three primary arguments to save
the Limestone facility. First, Maine argued that the
data that the department used to determine the facility’s “military value ranking” was based on a number
of ﬂawed assumptions that produced misleading and
incorrect results. For example, the scoring discounted
the capacity of the Limestone DFAS to expand its
operations, to do so with an already secure environment (i.e., former military bases), and at relatively less
expense. Second, Maine argued that Limestone DFAS
has highly trained and motivated employees who
have a proven track record of performing services
at a cost substantially lower than the rate for other
DFAS sites. And ﬁnally, contrary to prevailing wisdom
cited above, Maine relied heavily on a non-military
value argument regarding economic impact. But our
reasoning was unique.
Unlike most other BRAC proposals, the recommendation to close the Limestone DFAS facility
represented a double closure. When the 1991 BRAC
round closed Loring Air Force Base, the ensuing 5,600
layoffs increased that region’s unemployment by more
than one-third. The Limestone DFAS had become the
cornerstone of the economic recovery efforts, which
the department was now taking away. Worse yet,
the Defense Department’s own data showed that the
regional impact of the 2005 Limestone DFAS closure
would be greater than in any other DFAS community in
the nation. Simply put, hitting Aroostook County twice
within 15 years with the heaviest of job losses was not
only undue and unfair, it was breach of faith from the
promise the department made in 1994.
Maine then went on the offensive to argue that
the Limestone facility should not only stay open, but
that it should be expanded as a low-cost “center of
excellence.” The Limestone facility’s operating costs
are one-half of those facilities in Columbus, Ohio,
and Indianapolis, Indiana, and well under one-third
of those in Denver, Colorado—the three sites slated
to absorb Limestone’s work. Again, Maine used the
department’s own ﬁnancial data to prove that point.
Showing both an impressive attention to detail
and a somewhat surprising level of compassion, the
commission agreed. It found that there were discrepancies in the DFAS sites’ military value scores, and that

the Limestone DFAS’s location on a former base gave
it both space and ﬂexibility for the future. The real
key, however, was the commission’s ﬁnding that the
department did not adequately consider the economic
impact of its recommendation. For accounting facilities in both Limestone and Rome, New York, which
had also suffered previous BRAC cuts, the commission
found that by retaining these two sites, the department
could both preserve operational capacity and strategic
redundancy, as well as eliminate an undue and unfair
economic impact. Concluding that the secretary deviated substantially from ﬁnal selection criteria 3, 4, and
6, the commission, again asserting its independence,
voted unanimously to keep the DFAS in Limestone and
Rome open, each with expansion.
THE CASES FOR BANGOR NAVAL RESERVE
CENTER AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD

T

he secretary also made two smaller recommendations with the potential to beneﬁt the state, both
of which were in the Bangor region. First, the secretary recommended moving seven positions from the
Bangor Naval Reserve Center to Brunswick Naval Air
Station. Although these positions could have then been
eliminated by force of the recommendation to close the
Brunswick NAS, Maine was able to get the commission
to bring these positions back to Bangor. Second, the
secretary recommended adding two KC-135 airplanes
and their crews to the Bangor Air National Guard. This
recommendation came under attack, however, by other
states that were losing such assets and their related legal
challenges that National Guard assets were not within
the jurisdiction of the BRAC Commission. In the end,
these legal challenges fell away and the commission
made several adjustments to the secretary’s overall allocation of National Guard assets. Nonetheless, Maine’s
effort to obtain the two additional planes and their
crews was afﬁrmed by the commission.
LESSONS LEARNED

L

ooking back, several decisions stand out as essential
to Maine’s success in the 2005 BRAC round. First,
Maine did not wait until its regional hearing to make
its case. Maine made its case much earlier at the site
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visits and in its frequent coordinated communications
with commissioners and staff. Maine also continued
to present its case even after the regional hearing
passed. Here, Maine took advantage of the commissioners’ willingness to meet with local community
groups during site visits even though they were not
statutorily required to do so. In this way, the commissioners received information beyond the standard
“party line” that the Defense Department required base
commanders to present. Indeed, it was in these meetings that the commission ﬁrst heard expert analyses
on shipyard capacity, expert rebuttal of the economic
justiﬁcation for the realignment of the Brunswick NAS,
and the pitch by DFAS to both preserve and expand its
operation. Such face-to-face meetings will prove crucial
in future rounds of base closures.

…the 2005 BRAC Commission accepted
86% of the secretary’s recommendations… .
Maine, for its part, won four of the ﬁve
total cases, and two of the three major
cases that it fought.
Second, Maine did not limit its contacts to just
commissioners. Maine understood very early on how
the BRAC Commission itself worked. BRAC staff
would ﬁrst sort through the voluminous data and then
make recommendations to the commissioners. Getting
BRAC staff to hear and accept Maine’s arguments early
was crucial. A good example of this was the unclassiﬁed and/or classiﬁed brieﬁng that Maine suggested
that commission staff receive regarding the emerging
submariner threat posed by China in evaluating the
Portsmouth shipyard and the long-term needs of the
U.S. Navy’s submarine support.
Third, Maine’s persistent communications with
the commissioners and their staff reinforced that they
were truly independent from the Defense Department.
They had their own fact-ﬁnding skills, their own
substantive expertise, with every bit as much experi46 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Winter 2005

ence as those in the department to make the right—
even if different—decisions.
Fourth, Maine turned quickly and consistently to
the local sites for their expertise on the relevant facts.
Local groups at each location got to work immediately
and worked tirelessly to pull together the facts and data
necessary to make a strong factual case. Such accurate and deep factual development was indispensable,
especially in the case of the work by Earl Donnell, an
expert in the maximum, excess, and surge workload
capacities of both the Portsmouth and the other three
public shipyards.
Fifth, where possible, Maine identiﬁed military
experts to argue the military value of the Portsmouth
and Brunswick facilities. Commissioners, of course,
expect politicians and community groups to defend
their constituent interests. So it was those who have
both military expertise and no particular home-state
bias who, like former Rear Admiral William Klemm
in the case of Portsmouth, would stand out with the
Commissioners.
Sixth, Maine’s effort was internally cooperative
and therefore very efﬁcient. There was strong coordination among the congressional delegations and governors of both Maine and New Hampshire. In a time
where political divisiveness and rancor often seem to
dominate the political landscape, the level of cooperation and collaboration in this effort was impressive.
Indeed, this effort was, in many respects, representative government at its best, with elected ofﬁcials from
local, state, and federal governments, the legislative and
executive branches, and the states of Maine and New
Hampshire all pulling in the same direction towards
one common goal.
Finally, Maine stuck to hard facts—not political,
rhetorical, or emotional appeals—to makes its cases.
This was perhaps the most commanding lesson that
Senator Snowe, the only member of the 2005 Maine
delegation who was a veteran of the 1991 Loring
hearing, brought forward for the defense. And Maine’s
and New Hampshire’s congressional delegations were
also well served by skilled staff who had the military
experience necessary to communicate effectively with
the commission and to translate those communications
effectively for the delegations and governors.
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CONCLUSION

I think it is you who
saved this shipyard. It was
your skill; your dedication; your excellence; and
your efﬁciency that saved
this shipyard. It was your
productivity; your consistency; your labor-management relations; and your
safety record that saved this
shipyard. It was your leadership; your innovation;
and your preeminence.

I

n the end, the 2005 BRAC Commission accepted
86% of the secretary’s recommendations, saving
by its own 20-year estimates some $15 billion. Of
the Defense Department’s 190 recommendations,
the commission approved 119 with no change and
accepted another 45 with amendments. Of the 33
major closures that the secretary recommended, the
commission approved 21, realigned seven, and rejected
ﬁve. Of the 29 major realignments that the secretary
recommended, the commission approved 25. Maine,
for its part, won four of the ﬁve total cases and two of
the three major cases that it fought.
As projected, lawsuits in or by eight states were all
unsuccessful in their attempt to overcome the commission’s recommendations to the president. And as further
expected, the president accepted the list without
change, and Congress did not exercise its authority
to disapprove the list. Consequently, on November 9,
2005, the commission’s recommendations took effect.
Clearly, the loss of the Brunswick NAS was disappointing, and many good people worked very hard to
save it. But, in retrospect, it appears that the Brunswick
facility was lost where a political delegation could
not win it: by the commission overruling the recommendations of the U.S. Northern Command, Fleet
Forces Command, and the department’s Infrastructure
Executive Council to keep Brunswick open. For its
part, Limestone DFAS was won on its excellent track
record of efﬁciency and service, and on the unique
and powerful “double closure” argument. And the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard was won by taking the
Navy’s capacity analysis head on. But that argument,
it is appropriate to note in closing, was made possible
only by the extraordinary performance record of the
Portsmouth’s highly skilled and dedicated employees.
As Senator Snowe told these workers after the
Commission announced its ﬁnal vote:
Two months ago, members of the BRAC
Commission traveled to these gates and you
met them by the thousands. And you had but
a simple message for them. You said, “Save
Our Shipyard.” That’s right; you asked them
to save your shipyard. Well, now that the
verdict is in, let me tell you what I think.

It was, in a word, you—
every one of you—who
saved this shipyard. This
win is yours; you earned it
and you deserve it. And
it has been my highest
privilege to represent you
and to help to tell your
commanding story.
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ENDNOTES
1. For a copy of the commission’s 800-page ﬁnal report
to the president, see http://www.brac.gov/docs/ﬁnal/
Volume1BRACReport.pdf
2. For a complete copy of the department’s 400-page
recommendations, see http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/
pdf/Vol_I_Part_2_DOD_BRAC.pdf
3. For the biographies of these Commissioners, see http://
www.brac.gov/commissioners. asp
4. For a verbatim copy of these eight criteria, see http://
www.brac.gov/docs/criteria_ﬁnal_jan4_05.pdf For a
complete copy of the 40-page 2005 BRAC statute, see
http://www.brac.gov/docs/BRAC05Legislation.pdf
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5. For documents relating to these prior BRAC rounds,
see http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/priorbracs.html
6. See, for example, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994);
National Federation of Federal Employees v. U.S., 905
F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1990) afﬁrming 727 F.Supp. 17 (D.C.
D.C. 1989); Illinois v. Cheney, 726 F.Supp. 219 (C.D. Ill.
1989); Cohen v. Rice, 800 F.Supp. 999 (D.C. Me. 1992)
(unsuccessful challenge to closure of Loring).
7. The quotes used in this discussion of the case for the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are taken from the testimony presented at the Maine’s regional hearing. For a
complete copy of the Maine delegation’s testimony on
Portsmouth, Brunswick, and Limestone at the regional
hearing on July 6, 2005, and for a copy of the delegation’s re-hearing testimony on Brunswick on August 10,
2005, see http://www.brac.gov/hearingInfo.asp.
8. Commissioner Philip Coyle spoke to this issue with this
memorable remark: “All human activity must involve
some amount of excess capacity. I don’t use my garage
24 hours a day, but I’m not about to tear it down.”
9. The BRAC statute provided for two different
vote counts for the commission. For example, the
Portsmouth and Limestone items required a ﬁve-vote
majority because the motion was on the secretary’s
recommendation. By contrast, the Brunswick vote
required a seven-vote majority because the motion was
on the commission’s recommendation.
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